In assessing the inherent, overall quality of a golf course — not in comparison to another but on its own, in a vacuum — it’s helpful to start at the bottom: What’s the worst hole out there? Out of 18, how many objectively bad or fair-to-middling holes are there really? In other words, what’s the Depth of Talent?

My digital media company serves golf clients primarily, and I’ve served on GOLF Magazine’s world top 100 course-rating panel since 1997. And yet, we can leverage this tactic to assess the quality of the current USMNT, of any national team really, especially as we reckon who can or should make the final World Cup roster of 26, for ‘26. In reading Brian Sciaretta’s fine depth-chart piece for Soccer America, I was reminded of this course-appraisal technique. When we apply it to this year’s USMNT, and to past national teams, it’s clear why so many consider this a Golden Generation of talent.

We’ll circle back to that familiar-but-thorny phrase. Meantime, look at the current crop of national-team wing backs. Sergiño Dest and Tim Weah may start, but strong arguments could be made for Max Arfsten and Alex Freeman, whose fine two-goal, two-way performance vs. Uruguay may have won himself a starting, more-central spot beside Tim Ream and Chris Richards in a back three. Joe Scally and John Tolkin, two fine players earning starter’s minutes in Germany, may well be on the outside looking in.

I don’t think it’s controversial to point this out: That’s a depth of USMNT talent we have never seen before on any USMNT, even with an injured Antonee Robinson (a top 5 left back in the English Premiership) not in the mix for now. Do you recall who started at outside back for the U.S. at World Cup 2002? Tony Sanneh and Frankie Hejduk (Steve Cherundolo was hurt and David Regis didn’t play). Nice players but absolutely no depth.

I’ve been ringing this bell about the current generation throughout the 2020s. I consider this crop to be damned gilded — because “golden generation” simply should mean the best collection of contemporaneous national team players yet produced.

It has nothing to do with how far a USMNT might have progressed at a major tournament. Just look at Sciaretta’s assessment of midfield roster candidates: 1. Tyler Adams, 2. Tanner Tessmann, 3. Weston McKennie, 4. Aidan Morris, 5. Sebastian Berhalter, 6. Cristian Roldan. I think Morris is overrated here (but man, he does look a very different player from when I saw him down in Guadalajara for the Mexico friendly in October 2024).

To explore the point, let’s remember the U.S. midfield that reached the last eight in South Korea/Japan. Pablo Mastroeni was a journeyman ball-winner who, nevertheless, performed superbly in that tournament playing atop a back four. Claudio Reyna remains as good a midfielder as this country has produced, and John O’Brien could have proved his equal, had injury not torpedoed his career. But do examine that roster from 24 years ago: Centrally, in tersm of Depth of Talent, the pickings were amazingly slim beyond these three stalwarts.

Not the case today. Roldan and Tessmann look fabulous together, in the absence of Adams and McKennie. And again: Look at who’s likely to miss out on a roster spot altogether: Johnny Cardoso (who logged 60 strong minutes vs. Inter in Atletico Madrid’s Champions League match before being injured against Barcelona), Yunus Musah, James Sands. These are fine talents playing, respectively, in La Liga, Serie A and the Bundesliga. Their likes have never before been LEFT OFF an American World Cup roster.

Depth of Talent Showed at World Cup 2022

The current cohort of USMNT talent has taken a lot of shit from various old boys the last 4-5 years. The charge: They haven’t won anything really (though I would strongly encourage anyone to rewatch the Yanks’ Round of 16 loss to the Netherlands in Qatar; they didn’t win that match, but it was a superb performance in my view against excellent competition).

As indicated, part of the issue is semantic. We have to decide what “Golden Generation” truly means. My first futbol book, Generation Zero, essentially followed the first legit generation of footballers this country ever produced. The 1990 men’s national team that got clobbered in Italy was nevertheless a unicorn in this country’s long, futile history of talent development. Turns out, all you gotta do is get kids into youth soccer programs before the age of 10. That’s honestly how the Youth Soccer Revolution of the 1970s produced this stellar group of native-born players — not just the men, but the 1991 world champion USWNT, as well.

What Golden Generation does not mean, or measure, is how far national teams might progress at a major tournament. Underlining a new high-water mark of talent tells us far more about a nation’s historical progress. Six starters off that 1990 USMNT would also start on the 1994 World Cup squad, which went out in the Round of 16 to eventual champion Brazil. Influence over multiple World Cup cycles provides still more useful perspective.

It says here that Golden Generation is largely misunderstood. All it means is a critical mass of talent that exceeds previous iterations. It does not mean the group that went furthest in a World Cup, which, of course, is something we can assess only after the fact.

On this subject, Herc Gomez, whose punditry I generally admire, can be heard speaking these days out of both sides of his mouth. He has generally derided the current crop, or rather, the crop that buoyed the USMNT through the 2022 World Cup into 2025, as having achieved nothing. He’s not wrong. But I just heard him chatting on John Schrader on SA’s Soccer Media Podcast, where the Mexican American pointed out, quite rightly, that while Bruce Arena’s 2002 squad did make a World Cup quarterfinal, that team was extraordinarily fortunate to get out of its group — and to draw a familiar Concacaf foe (Mexico) in the Round of 16.

Like Depth of Talent, Golden Generation is a Moving Target

These are the very thin margins separating great tournament showings from middling or outright disappointing ones. And so, this metric seems a dubious measure for generations of players, and whether they represent an historical apogee, or not.

Once we move past the semifinal appearance in the inaugural Mundial, back in 1930, that 2002 team remains the benchmark for World Cup achievement — and there were some very talented players who made that roster and played very well at the game’s highest level. Brian McBride, for example. What a stud he proved to be in South Korea. Yet check out his strike partners on that squad: Josh Wolff primarily, along with Joe Max-Moore and an aging Earnie Stewart. Yikes. Landon Donovan was a sensation, coming in off the left flank, much like Christian Pulisic does today. Clint Mathis was dangerous in a more withdrawn role.

Compare that to those fighting for mere roster spots today. If healthy, Folarin Balogun, Haji Wright and Ricardo Pepi are near locks to make the squad. Forward-going support includes Pulisic, Malik Tillman, Diego Luna, Brenden Aaronson and Gio Reyna. I feel as though Aaronson continues to regress; Jack McGlynn (when back to health) and especially Alex Zendejas could move past him. They are superb talents. Yet both might stay home. Depth of Talent matters.

Incidentally, the heavy favorite in the Yanks’ 2002 WC group was Portugal, thanks to a so-called Golden Generation of talent led by Luis Figo, Rui Costa, Joao Pinto, Pauleta and Sergio Conceicao, among others. The plucky Americans shocked A Seleção 3-2 in the opener, before Figo & Co. lost again to South Korea on Matchday 3 – a result that sent the Americans, ass-first (they laid a massive egg in the group finale vs. Poland) into the Round of 16.

The Point(s): The Yanks were very lucky to get out of their group. Also, no one in Portugal considers this crew particularly gilded today. Not because they messed up the 2002 World Cup; this same generation advanced to the 2000 Euro semifinal and finished runner-up four years later. But rather because today’s generation of Portuguese players, the depth of talent, is objectively even better. [Note: They are my pick to win the World Cup in 2026.]

The U.S. is not a footballing nation in this class. Very few of the 270-odd FIFA-sanctioned countries are. Chile arguably isn’t, but the Roja rode a Golden Generation of talent — led Arturo Vidal, Alexis Sanchez, Gary Medel and Gonzalo Jara — to consecutive Copa América titles and a Confederations Cup final. This 4-year period produced both the best competitive performances in Chilean futbol history, driven by the best crop of talent the nation ever produced.

This summer, no one’s picking the Americans to do anything but maybe reach and credibly contest a World Cup quarterfinal. But Poch still enjoys a range of choices that no USMNT manager has ever entertained. And that’s a very good thing.